Public Comment

California ended its 2026 legislative session without agreement on another major rewrite of financial responsibility when utility equipment causes catastrophic wildfires. Governor Gavin Newsom and investor-owned utilities sought structural changes that could reduce utilities’ exposure and protect their ability to borrow and invest, while fire survivors, insurers and consumer advocates resisted shifting costs away from utilities. A late compromise, SB 492, preserved uncapped survivor compensation and insurer subrogation, allowing insurers to seek reimbursement from utilities, but the Assembly did not take it up. The unresolved debate affects victim recovery, electricity rates, utility creditworthiness and investment in a safer electric grid. Someone ultimately pays after a utility-caused wildfire: investors, insurers, ratepayers, taxpayers or survivors. The real policy problem is assigning that risk without weakening either accountability or the grid investments meant to prevent the next fire.

Which balance should California strike between wildfire victims and utility financial stability?

Overall results

1
72% support · excluded by 6%
7

Victims should not receive less because a fire is unusually destructive. California can preserve recovery rights while spreading truly catastrophic financing across utilities, insurance mechanisms and carefully conditioned public structures.

7

Any expanded backstop should reward measurable wildfire mitigation and penalize poor safety performance. Otherwise taxpayers or ratepayers absorb risk without changing the conduct that creates it.

2
50% support · excluded by 12%
7

California should be very cautious about changing legal rights after disasters specifically because large defendants find existing liability expensive. Accountability loses meaning if it disappears when damages become large.

7

Families who lose homes and communities should not become the financial shock absorber for a regulated utility. Liability creates a direct reason to maintain equipment and reduce preventable ignition risks.

3
39% support · excluded by 8%
4
36% support · excluded by 10%
7

A regulated monopoly cannot simply exit the market after a catastrophe. California needs a liability structure severe enough to enforce safety but survivable enough to maintain essential electric service.

7

Utilities finance enormous infrastructure programs in capital markets. If unpredictable wildfire liabilities make borrowing dramatically more expensive, customers eventually pay through rates and delayed grid investment.

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